08-26-03 @ 10:55 am EDT

NASA Culture Blamed in Shuttle Report
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By PAUL RECER, AP Science Writer

WASHINGTON - The destruction of space shuttle Columbia and the death of its seven astronauts were caused by a NASA (news - web sites) culture driven by schedule, starved for funds and burdened with an eroded, insufficient safety program, investigators said Tuesday.

The Columbia Accident Investigation Board, in a wide-ranging analysis of decades of NASA history, said the space agency's attitude toward safety is little improved since the 1986 Challenger disaster, which also killed seven, and that without fundamental changes more tragedies will occur.

"The board strongly believes that if these persistent, systemic flaws are not resolved, the scene is set for another accident," the report said.

In events leading up to the loss of Columbia, the report said, NASA mission managers fell into the habit of accepting as normal some flaws in the shuttle system and tended to ignore or not recognize that these problems could foreshadow catastrophe. This is an "echo" of some root causes of the Challenger accident, the board said.

"These repeating patterns mean that flawed practices embedded in NASA's organizational system continued for 20 years and made substantial contributions to both accidents," the 248-page report said.

During Columbia's last mission, NASA managers missed opportunities to evaluate possible damage to the craft's heat shield from a strike on the left wing by flying foam insulation. Such insulation strikes had occurred on previous missions and the report said NASA managers had come to view them as an acceptable abnormality that posed no safety risk.

This attitude also contributed to the lack of interest in getting spy satellite photos of Columbia, images that might have identified the extent of damage on the shuttle, and led to incorrect conclusions.

But most of all, the report noted, there was "ineffective leadership" that "failed to fulfill the implicit contract to do whatever is possible to ensure the safety of the crew."

Management techniques in NASA, the report said, discouraged dissenting views on safety issues and ultimately created "blind spots" about the risk to the space shuttle of the foam insulation impact.

Throughout its history, the report found, "NASA has consistently struggled to achieve viable safety programs" but the agency effort "has fallen short of its mark."

Sean O'Keefe, who heads the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, had warned space workers earlier this summer that they should prepare themselves for a report that will be "really ugly" as it outlines flawed engineering decisions that led to the destruction of Columbia as it returned to Earth following a 16-day mission.

O'Keefe said Monday that he was telling space workers "we need to not be defensive about that and try to not take it as a personal affront." Rather, he said, they should view it as a roadmap for getting the shuttle back into orbit.

The board made 29 recommendations, including changes it said NASA must make to start flying again and long-range changes that will alter the space agency culture.

"The changes we recommend will be difficult to accomplish — and will be internally resisted," the report said.

Some blame in the report was shifted to Congress and the White House because for almost a decade NASA lived on a lean budget that actually lost 13 percent of its purchasing power from 1993 to 2002.

At the same time, NASA was under pressure to build the International Space Station (news - web sites). To cut costs, the agency reduced its staff and contractor work force from about 32,000 in 1991 to just over 19,000 in 1997.

"The White House, Congress and NASA leadership exerted constant pressure to reduce or at least freeze operating costs (for the space shuttle)," the report said. As a result, "safety and support upgrades were delayed or deferred, and Shuttle infrastructure was allowed to deteriorate."

At another point, the report noted: "Little by little, NASA was accepting more and more risk in order to stay on schedule." Also: "The program was operating too close to too many margins."

The report reaffirmed the board's conclusion that Columbia was destroyed as the result of a breach in the heat shield on the craft's left wing. The board said that foam insulation peeled from the external fuel tank during launch in January and struck the wing at a high speed.

When Columbia re-entered the atmosphere on Feb. 1, superheated air penetrated the wing and melted it from the inside, causing the spacecraft to break apart and scattering debris over parts of Texas and Louisiana.

Columbia's crew died within seconds after Mission Control lost signals from the shuttle.

"The destruction of the crew module took place over a period of 24 seconds beginning at an altitude of approximately 140,000 feet," the report said. Death was attributed to blunt trauma and loss of oxygen.

A final video from inside the crew compartment, just minutes before the breakup, showed that three crewmembers were not wearing the pressure suits, gloves and helmets prescribed for re-entry. However, this oversight "did not affect their chances of survival," a the report said.

The 13-member investigation board was announced by NASA within hours of the accident. Led by retired Navy Adm. Harold Gehman Jr., the board members spent almost seven months reviewing evidence, talking to engineers and conducting experiments that proved fast-flying foam could damage the heat shield on the wing of a space shuttle.

Five preliminary recommendations were released during the investigation, and O'Keefe said those are already being acted on by the agency.

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On the Net:

Columbia Accident Investigation Board: www.caib.us

http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&u=/ap/20030826/ap_on_sc/shuttle_investigation

This is, like, such a stunner to me. I had no idea. Wow.

What did I say back in February?

Challenger exploded because of an O-ring. Columbia most likely fell to pieces because of the cutbacks from Challenger. Let's see how well the government does now with the cutbacks from Columbia--which shuttle will disintegrate next?--Discovery? Atlantis?--Countdown To The End Of Manitou Island, Pt. 1

In completely different news, have you heard that new song on the radio...by Simply Red?? I heard it the first time a few nights ago and thought, "What are they doing playing an oldie? That tune sounds a lot like Hall & Oates." Then I heard it the next night and first thought, "WHAT THE HELL! It can't be an oldie if they're playing it this frequently!" and my second thought was, "That IS music by Hall & Oates!" At first I thought the singer was Murray Head...you know...the guy who sang "One Night In Bangkok" for that musical Chess. ^_^ *LOL*...I am a loser. I knew it couldn't be him but that's what it sounded like. Then I kept forgetting to check out online who it was (I jotted down some lyrics; hobby of mine, to help me find odd songs) until today. And all hits came up with Simply Red. !!! I did not think they (he?) were even around anymore! They were like a blip on the radar in the Eighties with "If You Don't Know Me By Now" (wasn't THAT song a remake?), then they just vanished. Wow. I really thought they were just...GONE or something. Well, at least I correctly identified Hall & Oates's "I Can't Go For That," even if I had no clue who the singer was; I really thought Murray Head had resurrected himself and was now sampling Hall & Oates. *LOL!*

BTW, did you know that while they (or he, whoever Simply Red is) were trying to think up a name for the band, I believe one of their older names had been the Frantic Elevators? (At least this is what I heard from a DJ on the radio long ago.) They went with the word "Red," but wanted to include something else in the name. They thought and thought and finally somebody said in exasperation, "What about simply...Red?"

Like I'm telling you, that's just what I heard. Don't go forwarding it in e-mail like it's God's own truth or anything. Tar...